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I. INTRODUCTION
Few 18-year-old athletes are ready to compete as professionals in
physical sports such as football. College coaching, playing experience, and
physical development are needed to groom even the most gifted atheletes.
At some point, however, these athletes are capable of playing professional-
ly. This Comment will examine the plight of athletes who are ready, will-
ing, and able to play professional baseball, basketball, and football, but
who are prevented from doing so by rules adopted by the professional
sports establishment.' Specifically, this Comment will examine the
1. While numerous sports are played professionally in the United States,
this Comment will examine only the sports of baseball, basketball, and football.
The legal implications discussed herein, however, are applicable to all profes-
sional sports. See generally United States v. International Boxing Club of New
York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (boxing); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n,
358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1968) (golf); Drysdale v.
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eligibility and draft procedure rules of professional baseball, the National
Basketball Association (NBA), and the National Football League (NFL),
and analyze those rules in light of the exemptions allowed from and the
prohibitions imposed by Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.2
II. THE LEAGUE RULES
The eligibility and draft rules of professional baseball, basketball, and
football limit an athlete's ability to enter the leagues and his freedom to
negotiate and contract with the team of his choice. The eligibility rules bar
certain athletes from entering the league and require those athletes who do
enter the league to participate in a player draft4 before contracting to play
for a team.5 The draft procedure rules grant exclusive negoTiating and
contracting rights to the selecting team. Thus, they restrict the athlete in
two ways: he cannot choose where or with which team to play, and he can-
not freely negotiate his salary because of the lack of competitive bidding
for his services.
6
A. Eligibility Rule Restraints
Each league has rules that govern the eligibility of an athlete to enter
the league and to negotiate and contract by setting standards that athletes
must meet before they are eligible to be drafted by a team. 7 Thus, an
Florida Team Tennis, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (tennis); Blalock
v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (golf);
Heldman v. United States Lawn Tennis Ass'n, 354 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (tennis); Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972)
(hockey); Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (hockey);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v.
Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), remanded, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972)
(hockey).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
3. "League" and "leagues" shall be used to mean professional sports
organizations that represent management and ownership interests.
4. The word "draft" shall refer to the system whereby the teams in the
leagues select exclusive negotiating rights to eligible athletes. Once an athlete is
drafted by a team, no other team may negotiate for his services without acquiring
the exclusive right to negotiate with him from the team that drafted him. In pro-
fessional baseball, the right to draft and negotiate may not be traded away or
sold. In the National Basketball Association (NBA) and the National Football
League (NFL), drafting and negotiatingrights are negotiable. See notes 28 & 29
and accompanying text infra. See generally Goldstein, Out of Bounds Under the
Sherman Act? Player Restraints in Professional Team Sports, 4 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 285, 287-88 (1977) (discussion of draft mechanisms).
5. See notes 7-17 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 18-32 and accompanying text infra.
7. The eligibility and draft procedure rules are contained in the Profes-
sional Baseball Rules (baseball), the Collective Bargaining Agreement Between
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athlete who is capable of competing in professional sports cannot do so if
he does not meet these standards, either because of age or college sports
status. The professional baseball rules restrain athletes the least because
they allow an athlete to become eligible for the draft in many ways. A high
school student is eligible for the baseball draft if he drops out of school and
remains out for one year after graduation. He is also eligible for the draft
at any time after losing eligibility to participate in high school athletics due
to age, completion of the maximum number of semesters of attendance set
by the school, or completion of the maximum number of seasons in which
he was eligible to participate in any major high school sport." A athlete
otherwise eligible under the high school rule loses eligibility if he becomes a
member of the baseball team9 of a major four-year college,10 and he
generally does not regain draft eligiblity until he completes his college
eligibility or withdraws from college."
The entry of athletes into professional basketball is not restrained
significantly by the NBA eligibility rules. Any athlete may become eligible
for the draft if his high school class has graduated and he renounces his in-
tercollegiate basketball eligibility by written notice to the NBA at least
forty-five days before the draft.' 2 Although the NBA collective bargaining
the National Basketball Association and the National Basketball Players Associa-
tion (basketball) [hereinafter referred to as NBA Agreement], and the Constitu-
tion and By-Laws for the National Football League (football) [hereinafter
referred to as NFL Constitution].
8. Professional Baseball Rules, Rule 3(h).
9. A college athlete is a member of his college baseball team in the follow-
ing situations:
(a) if he is a freshman in a college that does not have an intercollegiate
freshman baseball program, or if his college does have such a pro-
gram and he is a member or a prospective member of the freshman
squad;
(b) if he is a sophomore and is a member or a prospective member of
the varsity baseball squad;
(c) if he is a junior and is a member or a prospective member of the var-
sity baseball squad; or
(d) if he is a senior and is a member or a prospective member of the var-
sity baseball squad.
Id. Rule 3(k).
10. The baseball rules define "college" as
any university or other institution of higher education located in the con-
tinental United States, including but not limited to, all members of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association, which confers degrees upon
students following completion of sufficient credit hours to equal a four-
year course, provided the college is represented by a baseball team which
participates in intercollegiate competition.
Id. This definition encompasses most four-year institutions.
11. Id. Rule 3(k)(2).
12. NBA Agreement, supra note 7, art. XXII, § l(a)(2)(f). This procedure
commonly was known as the "hardship rule" because a player who wished to use
1981] 799
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agreement does not mention other methods of becoming eligible, a high
school graduate who does not renounce his intercollegiate basketball
eligibility presumably will be eligible after he graduates from college or ex-
hausts his college eligibility. Unlike baseball,Is these rules do not allow an
athlete to become eligible while he is still in high school. The restraint im-
posed on athletes by this difference is minimal, however, for an athlete
rarely possesses the ability to compete in the NBA before he completes
high school.
The NFL eligibility rules are the most restrictive because they general-
ly assume that an athlete attended college. Generally, an athlete is not
eligible -either to play or to be selected in the draft unless he has exhausted
his college football eligibility, five years have elapsed since he first attend-
ed or entered a junior college, college, or university, or he has graduated
from a college or university before September 1 of the next NFL season. 14
If an athlete does not play college football, he will be eligible for the draft
after four football seasons have elapsed since he entered college."5 Under
the NFL rules, therefore, an athlete usually will not become eligible to
play professional football before age twenty-two. In some cases, several
years have passed since the athlete was physically capable of competing on
the professional level. 16 Thus, competition between athletes in the league
and those who wish to enter the league is restrained substantially by the
NFL eligibility rules.
An additional time restraint is imposed by all three sports. An other-
wise eligible athlete cannot sign with a team until after he has participated
this rule to become eligible for the NBA draft before graduating from college or
completing his college eligibility was required to show some financial necessity.
The rule has been amended, however, so that a showing of hardship is no longer
required. Under this rule, an athlete now may become eligible for the NBA draft
after his high school class has graduated by giving written notice, regardless of
what he has done after high school. Id.
13. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
14. NFL Constitution, supra note 7, art. XII, § 12.1(A).
15. Id.
16. The position of Herschel Walker, a running back for the University of
Georgia Bulldogs football team, best illustrates the hardship that these re-
quirements impose. During his freshman season, Walker gained over 1,500 yards
rushing, which broke the previous record for a freshman, and led the Bulldogs to
the national title, as determined by the Associated Press and United Press Inter-
national polls. He placed third in the balloting for the Heisman Trophy, an
award given annually to the year's best college football player. Although scouts
for the league teams believe that Walker could have played professional football
immediately after high school, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 3, 1980, at 63
(quoting Gil Brandt, vice president in charge of personnel development for the
Dallas Cowboys professional football franchise), the NFL rules bar Walker's entry
into the league and deny him the livelihood he now could earn.
[Vol. 46
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in the first draft occurring after he becomes eligible. 17 While this delay
usually is shorter than the restriction imposed by the eligibility re-
quirements, it further delays an athlete's entry into professional sports.
B. Draft Procedure Rule Restraints
An athlete who meets the eligibility requirements for entry into the
league faces a second restraint on his ability to negotiate and contract with
league teams. The rules of each sport establish draft procedures in which
teams select the exclusive right to negotiate and contract with eligible
athletes.18 Thus, a drafted athlete is restricted because he may negotiate
and sign only with the selecting team. If he does not choose to contract
with that team, he cannot sign with or play for any other league team for a
specified period of time.' 9
The NBA draft procedure is the least harsh because an athlete who
does not sign with the selecting team may wait a year and be selected by
another team in the next draft.20 If an athlete does not sign with the team
that selects him in the second draft or if he is not selected in a draft in
which he is eligible, he becomes a free agent who is able to negotiate and
contract with any team. 21
The baseball draft procedure rules also allow an eligible athlete who
does not sign with a selecting team to be selected by another team in the
next draft.22 Since baseball conducts two drafts each year, 23 an athlete is
bound to the selecting team for only six months, compared with the one
year under the NBA rules. 24 The baseball draft procedure rules are more
restrictive then the NBA rules, however, because an athlete does not
become a free agent after failing to sign with the team that selects him in
the second baseball draft, as he does after the second NBA draft.25 In-
stead, an eligible athlete becomes a free agent in professional baseball only
17. Professional Baseball Rules, Rule 4(b); NBA Agreement, supra note 7,
art. XXII, § 1(a)(1) (by implication); NFL Constitution, supra note 7, art. XII, §
12.1(F).
18. Professional Baseball Rules, Rule 4(b); NBA Agreement, supra note 7,
art. XXII, § 1(a)(2)(a); NFL Constitution, supra note 7, art. XII, § 12.1(G).
19. Professional Baseball Rules, Rule 4(b) (approximately six months);
NBA Agreement, supra note 7, art. XXII, § l(A)(2) (one year); NFL Constitu-
tion, supra note 7, art. XII (until waived by selecting team).
20. NBA Agreement, supra note 7, art. XXII, § 1(a)(2)(b).
21. Id. The procedural rules differ slightly for a player who becomes eligible
for the draft by renouncing his intercollegiate eligibility in writing. If he later
returns to play intercollegiate basketball, he will not become a free agent until
after his third draft. Id. § l(a)(2)(f).
22. Professional Baseball Rules, Rule 4(d)(1).
23. Id. Rule 4(d).
24. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
25. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
1981]
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if he is not drafted in a subsequent draft. 26 As long as he is drafted, the
selecting team retains the exclusive right to negotiate and contract with
him until the next draft. 27 The baseball rules further restrict an athlete's
freedom to negotiate and contract because, unlike the NBA28 and the
NFL, 29 they do not allow the selecting team to trade or sell the exclusive
rights to an athlete's services to another league team. Thus, even athletes
with leverage cannot force the selecting team to trade or sell those rights to
a team for which the athlete would prefer to play.
The NFL draft procedure rules impose the greatest restraint because
an athlete who does not sign with the selecting team may not participate in
the following draft unless the selecting team releases its exclusive right to
the athlete's services by notifying the league commissioner that it has cut or
"waived" the athleteA0 A waived athlete may negotiate with other teams;
an athlete who is not waived is not subject to any future drafts and
presumably is bound to the selecting team indefinitely. Under the NFL
rules, the athlete is not able to escape the exclusive right of a selecting team
by waiting until the next draft without signing a contract, as he can in the
NBA or professional baseball. The decision on the athlete's future in the
NFL is made entirely by the drafting team. Thus, the athlete's limited
freedom to negotiate and contract is restricted even further.
In addition to the restriction the draft procedure rules impose on an
athlete's ability to choose where and for which team he will play, the draft
procedures of all three sports hinder the athlete's power to bargain over his
salary. Since only one team can negotiate with an athlete, the teams do not
bid against each other for the athlete's services. Thus, salaries are held
below their open market value because of the elimination of competitive
bidding.31
In varying degrees, therefore, the eligibility and draft procedure rules
of professional baseball, basketball, and football restrain athletes from
competing for jobs with league teams and restrain the athletes' freedom to
negotiate and contract with those teams. A remedy for these restraints is
needed. If one exists, it most likely will be found in the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 32
26. Professional Baseball Rules, Rule 4(h)(2).
27. Id.
28. NBA Agreement, supra note 7, art. XXII, § 1(a)(3).
29. NFL Constitution, supra note 7, art. XII, § 12.1(G).
30. Id. art. XII.
31. The huge salaries garnered in the competitive bidding for baseball's
veteran free agents illustrate the potential effect on salaries if competitive bidding
is allowed. Between 1976 and 1980, 43 players signed contracts worth at least $1
million after participating in baseball's veteran free agent draft. SPORTS IL.
LUSTRATED, Apr. 20, 1981, at 49.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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III. THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS
The restraints these league rules impose often are challenged as con-
spiracies that restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 8
The antitrust laws do not apply to all types of commerce, however, and if
one of several exemptions applies, that commerce is not subject to the anti-
trust laws. 4 The leagues argue that two exemptions apply to their rules:
the baseball exemption8" and the labor exemption. 6
A. The Baseball Exemption
Because of an early decision and a subsequent strict application of the
doctrine of stare decisis,S7 the antitrust laws are not applied to professional
baseball. In Flood v. Kuhn, 0 the United States Supreme Court upheld
prior decisions that pr6fessional baseball is exempt from the antitrust
laws.39 In the first of these decisions, Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,40 the Court held
that professional baseball was exempt from the antitrust laws because
those who play in and arrange baseball games are not engaged in interstate
commerce. 41 The determination was based on the finding that the
business of baseball was to give "exhibitions... which are purely state af-
fairs." 42 Thus, the jurisdictional prerequisite for imposition of Sherman
33. Id.
34. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §
235-239 (1977). Statutes'and judicial decisions exempt specific areas of commerce
from the antitrust laws: regulated industries, id. § 239, governmental action and
its solicitation, id. § 238, labor organizations, id. § 237, agricultural cooperatives
and the fishing industry, id. § 236.
55. See pp. 803-06 infra. See generally Martin, The Aftermath of Flood v.
Kuhn: Professional Bas Aall -- xemption from Antitrust Regulation, 3 W. ST.
U.L. REV, 262, 263 (1976); Roberts & Powers, Defining the Relationship Be-
tween Antitrust Law and Labor Law: Professional Sports and the Current Legal
Battleground, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 397-400 (1978); Comment, Nearly
a Century in Reserve: Organized Baseball: Collective Bargaining and the Anti-
trust Exemption Enter the 80's, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 313,_316-24 (1981).
36. See pp. 806-13 infra. See generally Leslie, Principles ofLabor Antitrust,
66 VA. L. REv. 1183, 1201-24 (1980); Roberts & Powers, supra note 35, at
417-67; Comment, supra note 35, at 341-50; Comment, The Eighth Circuit Sug-
gests a Labor Exemption from Antitrust Laws for Collectively Bargained Labor
Agreements in Professional Sports, 21 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 565 (1977).
37. See note 50 and accompanying text infra.
38. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
39. Id. at 283-84.
40. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
41. Id. at 208-09.
42. Id. at 208.
1981] 803
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Antitrust Act sanctions was not met; the conduct did not restrain trade or
commerce "among the several States, or With foreign nations." 4
When Federal Baseball was decided, interstate commerce was defined
narrowly." Subsequent decisions have broadened the definition of inter-
state commerce; thus, the reasoning of Federal Baseball is no longer
valid.45 This point was alluded to in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. ,46
when the Supreme Court was asked to overrule Federal Baseball by apply-
ing the broader definition of interstate commerce, i.e., any conduct that
"affects" interstate commerce. 47 Although the Court declined to overrule
Federal Baseball in Toolson,4 8 the decision was not based on the narrow
interstate commerce analysis found in Federal Baseball:
Congress has had the ruling under consideration but has not seen
fit to bring such business under these laws by legislation having
prospective effect. The business has thus been left for thirty years
to develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing
antitrust legislation.... We think that if there are evils in this field
which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should
be by legislation. Without re-examination of the underlying
issues, the judgments below are affirmed on the authority of...
[Federal Baseball] so far as that decision determines that Congress
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 54, §§
252-234.
44. In Federal Baseball, the Court refused to hold that intrastate conduct
that affected interstate commerce was, itself, interstate in nature: "That which in
its consummation is not commerce does not become commerce among the States
because the transportation [across state lines] that we have mentioned takes
place." 259 U.S. at 209. This is consistent with cases decided prior to 1957, which
required a direct connection between the conduct and the stream of interstate
commerce for the conduct to be subject to federal legislation under the commerce
clause. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Stafford v. Wallace, 258
U.S. 495 (1922). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 134-65 (1978).
45. The requirement that conduct be in the stream of interstate commerce
was rejected in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 501 U.S. 1, 36 (1936).
The Court established a test for interstate commerce that is satisfied if local con-
duct affects commerce between the states. Id. at 57-39. Under this test, profes-
sional baseball constitutes interstate commerce. See generally United States v. In-
ternational Boxing Club, 548 U.S. 256 (1955); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S.
222 (1955); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 815 U.S. 110 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
46. 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
47. Id. at 356-57.
48. Id. at 357.
804 [Vol. 46
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [1981], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/3
1981] ANTITRUST AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
had no intention of including the business of baseball within the
scope of the federal antitrust laws. 49
The Toolson decision was purely an exercise of stare decisis: Congress
knows of Federal Baseball and has not altered the statute expressly to in-
clude baseball. " The Toolson Court apparently interpreted this inactivity
as tacit congressional approval of the result of Federal Baseball. Evidence
that Congress has considered this issue buttresses the inference of congres-
sional approvalA1
Following Toolson, the Supreme Court considered arguments that the
baseball exemption should be applied to professional football and basket-
ball. In both instances, the Court refused to expand the exemption
granted to professional baseball in Federal Baseball. In Radovich v. Na-
tional Football League,52 the Court held that the exemption for baseball
did not apply to football and that the antitrust laws applied to professional
football.53 The Court made this statement:
If this ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient
to answer, aside from the distinctions between the businesses, that
were we considering the question of baseball for the first time upon
a clean slate we would have no doubts. But... [Federal Base ball
held the business of baseball outside the scope of the Act. No other
business claiming the coverage of those cases has such an adjudica-
tion.54
In Haywood v. National Basketball Association,5r the Court held that the
baseball exemption did not apply to professional basketball.55
The baseball exemption again was challenged in Flood v. Kuhn.57 The
Court examined the history of the exception and adopted the approach
provided in Toolson: Federal Baseball is wrong, but Congress, and not the
Court, must correct it. 5r Three members of the Court dissented in Flood.
Justice Douglas would have overruled Federal Baseball and Toolson. 9
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. at 229-30.
51. 346 U.S. at 357. The Toolson dissent noted that a report issued by the
Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary concluded that baseball was "'[i]nherently... inter-
city, intersectional, and interstate.'" Id. at 358 (Burton, J., dissenting) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952)).
52. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
53. Id. at 451-52.
54. Id. at 452.
55. 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (Douglas, Cir. J.).
56. Id. at 1205 (Douglas, Cir. J.).
57. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
58. Id. at 282-84.
59. Id. at 286-88 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
805
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Justice Marshall would have removed the antitrust exemption only pro-
spectively. 60Justice Brennan concurred withJustice Douglas' dissent 6' and
joined in Justice Marshall's dissent. 62 The dissenting Justices rejected the
argument that the inactivity of Congress evidenced acquiesence to Federal
Baseball."3 That inactivity was attributed to the isolation of the baseball
exemption; since the exemption does not apply to all major sports, Con-
gress simply has not been concerned enough to act.64
In conclusion, Radotich and Haywood clearly state that professional
football and basketball are not exempt from the antitrust laws under
Federal Baseball. The application of that exemption to professional
baseball, however, appears to be strongly entrenched by the decisions in
Toolson and Flood. In addition, each future decision that fails to apply the
baseball exemption to activities outside of baseball65 invites Congress to re-
ject expressly that exemption; each failure of Congress to act in response
adds weight to the Toolson argument that Congress has acquiesced to that
exemption. Considering the deference to legislative acquiesence stated in
Flood, the Court will find it increasingly difficult to overrule the cases that
exempted professional baseball from the antitrust laws.
B. The Labor Exemption
Although football and basketball are not exempt from the antitrust
laws under the baseball exemption,6 6 the NFL and NBA argue that their
eligibility and draft rules should escape antitrust analysis under the
statutory exemption from the antitrust laws that Congress has provided for
labor unions.6 7 To further the policy that supports the rights of workers to
join together to bargain collectively, Congress has provided that labor
organizations are not to be considered under the antitrust laws as com-
binations that restrain trade. 68 The advent of players' unions and associa-
60. Id. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 292 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. See, e.g., San Franciso Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F.
Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (professional hockey subject to antitrust laws);
Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
(professional golf subject to antitrust laws).
66. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text supra.
;7. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
68. Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976), provides the follow-
ing:
The labor of human beings is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, argricultural, or horticultural
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having
[Vol. 46
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tions in the NBA and NFL raises the question of whether the eligibility and
draft rules established in collective bargaining between the leagues and the
players' union representatives are exempt from the antitrust laws under
this congressional mandate.
1. Scope of the Labor Exemption
Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides that the antitrust laws do not
"forbid the existence and operation of labor... organizations"6 9 and labor
organizations and their members shall not "be held or construed to be il-
legal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust
laws." 0 Four decisions of the United States Supreme Court define the scope
of this exemption. In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW,71 the Court
stated that a labor organization that acts to aid a nonlabor group in con-
duct that restrains trade is not protected by the labor exemption and
violates section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 72 The Court struck down a
provision in a collective bargaining agreement which provided that con-
tractors could purchase electrical equipment only from manufacturers
whose employees also were represented by the union. In return, the
manufacturers agreed to sell only to contractors whose employees were
represented by the union. 73 Thus, both sets of employers effectively re-
duced competitive pressures from outside manufacturers and contractors.
In refusing to apply the labor exemption, the Court said, "We know
that Congress feared the concentrated power of business organizations to
dominate markets and prices. It intended to outlaw business monopolies.
A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such
participation [by the unioni is a violation of the Act. 74 The Court held
that the labor exemption did not apply because "[C]ongress never intend-
ed that unions could, consistently with the Sherman Act, aid non-labor
groups to create business monopolies and to control the marketing of
goods and services. ' 75 Thus, after Allen Bradley, the labor exemption no
longer provided an absolute escape for unions from the antitrust laws. 76
capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint
of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Id. See articles cited note 36 supra.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
70. Id.
71. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
72. Id. at 810.
73. Id. at 798-800.
74. Id. at 811.
75. Id. at 808.
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The rule that Allen Bradley established for application of the statutory
labor exemption was clear: the labor exemption protects conduct a union
undertakes by itself or in concert with other labor groups, but it does not
protect any conduct a union undertakes in concert with a nonlabor
organization. Such an absolute rule, however, did not allow adequate con-
sideration of the competing policies that underlie the labor and antitrust
laws. Thus, in UMWv. Pennington77 and Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co. ,78 announced as companion cases in 1965, the Court found
that the labor statutes implied the existence of a separate, nonstatutory
labor exemption, to which the strict Allen Bradley rule did not apply. 79
Pennington, a small coal producer alleged that the United Mine
Workers conspired to allow the larger coal producers to increase
mechanization in exchange for a higher wage structure for the employees.
Smaller producers could not afford the higher wages because they could
not afford the increased mechanization.80 Thus, the agreement restrained
trade because it forced the smaller coal producers out of business. InJewel
Tea, a multi-employer bargaining unit agreed to the following provision in
the collective bargaining agreement: "Market operating hours shall be
9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday through Saturday, inclusive. No customer
shall be served who comes into the market before or after the hours set
forth above. ' 81 An employer, Jewel Tea, who objected to this provision
throughout the negotiations, signed only because the union threatened to
strike. Jewel Tea then sued for violation of the Sherman Act, alleging that
the provision was an attempt by its competitors to limit the advantages of
increased mechanization possessed by Jewel Tea. 82 The company argued
that a member of the union would not be employed during the restricted
hours, and therefore, the union had no interest in the matter.8
Justice White wrote the key opinions in both cases. 84 In these opinions,
Justice White applied a test that balanced federal labor policies against an-
titrust policies.8 5 His stated concern was "harmonizing the Sherman Act
with the national policy expressed in the National Labor Relations Act of
promoting 'the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by subjecting
labor-management controversies to the mediatory influence of negotia-
77. 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (plurality).
78. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
79. Id. at 691.
80. 381 U.S. at 659-61.
81. 381 U.S. at 679-80.
82. Id. at 681-82.
83. Id. at 692.
84. Justice White wrote for a plurality of four in Pennington, and the ma-jority in Jewel Tea was represented by the opinions of Justices White and
Goldberg.
85. 381 U.S. at 691.
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tion.'"16 This balancing test first seeks to reconcile any policy conflict by
finding that one policy or the other does not apply to the dispute. If recon-
ciliation is impossible, the Court then weighs the force of the competing
policies as they apply to the case and follows the policy that more strongly
applies. 7
Thus, in Pennington, Justice White reconciled away any policy con-
flict by finding that the labor policy did not protect a wage agreement be-
tween a union and employers that other employers would be forced to
meet.88 Since the labor policy did not apply, the Court followed the policy
underlying the antitrust laws 9 and denied the union protection under the
labor exemption.90 Application of the same test led to a different result in
Jewel Tea. The Court was unable to reconcile the policy conflict because
both policies applied in that case. In balance, however, the labor policy
outweighed the antitrust policy, and 9 therefore, the labor exemption
from the antitrust laws protected the union agreement.9 2 Important fac-
tors in the balance were findings that the provision was a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining and that to be exempt, a provision must be produced by
bona fide, arm's length bargaining actively pursued by the union to fulfill
its labor goals. 98
The rest of the Justices rejected the balancing test and its variable
results and applied different tests that produced the same results in each
decision. Justice Goldb erg would have applied the labor exemption in both
cases, 94 based on a finding that both agreements dealt with mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining. Justice Goldberg reasoned that since
unions and employers are under a legal duty to bargain about mandatory
subjects of bargaining, the negotiation and agreement on all such subjects
should fall within the exemption." Justices Douglas, Black, and Clark
would have denied application of the labor exemption. 96 In both cases, the
union was acting in concert with a nonlabor group. TheseJustices felt that
they were dealing with the statutory labor exemption provided by the
Clayton Act to which the strict rule of Allen Bradley should apply. 97
86. 381 U.S. at 665 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379
U.S. 203, 211 (1964)).
87. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 237, at 729.
88. 381 U.S. at 666-67.
89. Id. at 668.
90. Id. at 669.
91. 381 U.S. at 690-91.
92. Id. at 690.
93. Id. at 689-90. See generally United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219
(1941) (statutory exemption does not protect activity that would be illegal under
antitrust laws if done by employer acting alone).
94. 381 U.S. at 697, 735.
95. Id. at 735.
96. 381 U.S. at 736; 381 U.S. at 672.
97. 381 U.S. at 738; 381 U.S. at 675.
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After Pennington and Jewel Tea, therefore, parties considering litiga-
tion faced the uncertain application of a broad balancing test when courts
determined if the nonstatutory labor exemption applied. Some of the
uncertainty was removed by the Supreme Court in Connell Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100.98 In Connell, the Court held that the
statutory labor exemptions do not apply to concerted action or agreements
between unions and nonlabor parties, 99 and that the nonstatutory labor
exemption implied from the labor policies does not protect all regulated
conduct, but only conduct that is authorized or approved by the labor
laws. 00 In conclusion, these four cases present three questions in the sports
league rules context: (1) which labor exemption, if any, applies, (2) who
can claim that exemption, and (3) what test determines if the claimed ex-
emption applies to the league rules?
2. Application of the Labor Exemption
The statutory labor exemption provided by the Clayton Act'01 cannot
be claimed by the NFL and the NBA because the league rules did not
result solely from union conduct as required by Allen Bradley.10 2 Thus,
the leagues can only argue that the nonstatutory labor exemption
recognized in Pennington andJewel Tea exempts their rules from the anti-
trust laws.
The second issue is whether the leagues can claim the nonstatutory
labor exemption. Usually, the labor union claims this exemption in
defense to a charge of anticompetitive conduct. This is logical because the
purpose of this exemption is to protect agreements that are won by the
union through the collective bargaining process, which labor policies
strongly support. In the league rules context, however, the professional
sports leagues would be arguing for application of the nonstatutory ex-
emption against their employees. It is doubtful, therefore, that the courts
would find strong support in the labor policies for applying the
nonstatutory labor exemption to defeat the goals of employees.
Even if the leagues can claim the nonstatutory labor exemption, it is
unlikely that they will succeed in maintaining that claim under the test for
application of that exemption stated in Mackey v. National Football
League.10 3 In Mackey, the NFL claimed that the so-called Rozelle Rule
was exempt from the antitrust laws. Mackey, an NFL veteran, challenged
the NFL rule that allowed the commissioner to decide the compensation to
be paid by a team that signs a veteran free agent from another team.104
98. 421 U.S. 616(i95).
99. Id. at 622.
100. Id. at 622-23.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
102. See notes 71-76 and accompanying text supra.
103. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
104. Id. at 610-11.
[Vol. 46810
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that
theJewel Tea-Pennington authority states three prerequisites for applying
the nonstatutory labor exemption to exempt conduct that restrains trade
from the antitrust laws. First, the restraint primarily may affect only the
parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second, the restraint
must be over a mandatory subject of bargaining. Third, it must be the pro-
duct of bona fide arm's length bargaining. 05
The leagues cannot meet the requirements of the Mackey test because
the league rules govern the employment circumstances of outsiders to the
agreement. Thus, the restraints imposed by the league rules do not
primarily affect only the parties to the agreement, and the first prereq-
uisite is not fulfilled. In addition, there is also some question about
whether the second part of the test is met. Unions legitimately may bargain
for provisions that affect third parties to the agreement. The principles for
determining when those provisions are mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining are found in three United States Supreme Court cases.' 06
Those cases, however, do not deal specifically with the labor exemption
question and, therefore, do not directly determine whether the league
rules meet the second requirement of the Mackey test. They do indicate,
however, the issues that are crucial to that determination.
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,10 7 the employer
unilaterally decided to contract out to a third party work that had been
done previously by union employees. 0 8 The question was whether such
contracting out was a mandatory subject of bargaining so that the
employer would be forbidden from taking action without first negotiating
the matter with the union.1 9 The United States Supreme Court held that
the issue concerned a term or condition of employment and was, there-
fore, a mandatory subject of bargaining." 0 The Court based its decision
on a finding that the issue was vitally important to the union and employer
and, therefore, the federal labor policy favoring negotiation in labor rela-
tions applied."'
The situation in Local 24, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Oliver"2 is more analogous to the league rules situation. Oliver, an inde-
pendent trucker and an outsider to the challenged agreement, sued the
105. Id. at 614.
106. Chemical Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157 (1971); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Local
24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). See notes 107-24 and
accompanying text infra.
107. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
108. Id. at 206.
109. Id. at 204-05.
110. Id. at 215.
111. Id. at 211.
112. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
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union for violation of state antitrust laws. He alleged that a provision of the
collective bargaining agreement amounted to price fixing because it con-
trolled the amount of money that an employer must pay him as an inde-
pendent contractor."3 The regularly employed truck drivers were repre-
sented by the union. The employer could hire extra truck drivers as
independent contractors." 4 The collective bargaining agreement with the
union dictated what expenses of operation incurred by the independent
truck drivers must be borne by the employer." 5 It also required that the
employer pay the independent drivers the same wages as similarly situated
union drivers. This provision kept the independent drivers, in effect, from
undercutting the price of labor by understating the costs of operating their
*vehicles."6 The issue the Court faced was whether federal labor policy pre-
empted the state antitrust remedy. The Court found that the state law was
pre-empted.1 7 Because the provision was labeled as one that controlled
wages, not prices, it was held to be a mandatory subject of bargaining." 8
The Court at least partially revealed the extent to which it applied the
reasoning of these cases to third parties in Chemical Workers Local No. 1
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.1 9 The employer determined that its health
plan for retired workers was rendered useless by Medicare. 120 The
Supreme Court upheld the unilateral change of health care plan by the
employer because the plan was not a mandatory subject of bargaining and
the retired workers were not "employees" as defined by the National Labor
Relations Act.' 2' The Court noted that Fibreboard and Oliver provided
the controlling principles 22 and stated that "the question is not whether
the third-party concern is antagonistic to or compatible with the interests
of bargaining-unit employees, but whether it vitally affects the 'terms and
conditions' of their employment.' ' 23 The Court held that the changes in
the retirees' benefits did not "vitally affect" the active employees.' 24
When these preceding cases are applied to the league rules situation, it
seems that the second requirement of the Mackey test is not met. The draft
and eligibility rules apply only t6 outsiders to the collective bargaining
agreements 25 and do not vitally affect the terms and conditions of players
113. Id. at 292-93.
114. Id. at 298-304 (appendix to Court's opinion).
115. Id. at 300.
116. Id. at 287-94.
117. Id. at 295-97.
1k8. Id. at 295.
119. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
120. Id. at 161.
121. Id. at 165-68.
122. Id. at 179.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 179-82.
125. See notes 105 & 106 and accompanying text supra.
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in the leagues. In addition, this interpretation of Fibreboard, Oliver, and
Chemical Workers destroys any argument for applying the approach ad-
vocated by Justice Goldberg in Pennington and Jewel Tea. 12 6 That ap-
proach looked solely to the nature of the subject of negotiation. If the
agreement dealt with a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, it was
protected by the labor exemption; otherwise, the labor exemption did not
apply. 27 This is the same as the second requirement of the Mackey test. 28
Since the leagues apparently cannot establish that the rules are mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining, 129 the claim for application of the labor
exemption is destroyed under the second requirement of the Mackey test
and under Justice Goldberg's approach.
Thus, the league rules should not be protected by the labor exemption
to the antitrust laws. Under Mackey, they would clearly not be exempt
because neither the first nor the second requirement of that test is met.
Even underJustice Goldberg's approach, which relies solely on whether the
agreement deals with a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, they
should not be found to be exempt.
IV. THE ANTITRUST ISSUES
A. Introduction
As discussed in Part III of this Comment, 13 0 professional football and
basketball are not exempt from the antitrust laws under the baseball ex-
emption' 3 ' and arguably should not be exempt under the labor exemp-
tion.13 2 In the future, Congress may expressly remove the exemption pro-
fessional baseball enjoys under Federal Baseball. 3 3 Thus, section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act may apply to the eligibility and draft rules of all
three sports. ' 4
Section 1 provides, "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."' 3 5 A two
126. See generally Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bar-
gaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 25-27 (1971).
127. See notes 94-95 and accompanying text supra.
128. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
129. See notes 106-24 and accompanying text supra.
i30. See pp. 803-13 supra.
131. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 101-29 and accompanying text supra.
133. This congressional response is invited by every judicial decision that
refuses to overrule the outdated logic of Federal Baseball because of the congres-
sional acquiesence implied from legislative inactivity under Toolson and the doc-
trine of stare decisis. See notes 48-51 and accompanying text supra.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See generally Roberts & Powers, supra note 35.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890. At first,
the Supreme Court interpreted this statute literally and held that § 1 condemned
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category approach has developed to determine whether certain conduct
violates section 1.16 Conduct that directly restrains competition is illegal
per se.'s 7 Conduct in this category, such as price fixing s8  market
division,8 9 tying arrangements, 40 and group boycotts, 14 1 is illegal
every restraint of trade. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S.
290, 340-41 (1897). It soon became apparent, however, that a literal reading
would be impractical. In 1898, the Court retreated from Trans-Missouri and ruled
that Congress intended to distinguish between restraints that are direct and im-
mediate and those that are indirect and remote. United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). Otherwise, in the Court's words, "'there would scarcely
be an agreement... among business men that could not be said to have, indirectly
or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain
it."' Id. at 568 (quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898)).
136. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 63, at 166.
137. Id. § 64, at 169. Under the per se rule, conduct that directly restrains
competition is subject to a conclusive presumption of illegality under § 1. Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911). Proof that the condemned
conduct occurred, by itself, establishes illegality. No anticompetitive effect or
purpose need be proven, and the conduct cannot be defended by assertions of
reasonableness or a lack of anticompetitive effect or purpose. See generally L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 67.
Although four specific types of conduct have been labeled illegal per se, other
types of conduct can be brought under this test as well. Professor Sullivan states
that, as applied today, the per se rule is applied to conduct if two elements are
established:
first, that the practice if effective is likely in the great generality of cases
to cause substantial injury to competition, and second, that an inquiry
into whether the practice will in this instance be injurious to competition
would be complex, time consuming, costly and, in the end, uncertain.
When both of these propositions ... accurately characterize a particular
trade practice, the principle of judicial efficiency warrants that the prac-
tice be banned out of hand.
Id. § 70, at 193.
138. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 27 U.S. 392, 396-402 (1927); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 293 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175
U.S. 271 (1899) (applying common law).
139. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
140. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). See Nor-
them Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1958).
141. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of
America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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regardless of its reasonableness, motive, or effect. 142 Other contracts, com-
binations, or conspiracies that restrain trade are analyzed under the rule of
reason for section 1.143
Thus, the first step in analyzing a contract, combination, or con-
spiracy under section 1 is to determine if the conduct restrains trade. If it
does, the next step is to inquire whether the conduct is one of the four types
that are per se violations of section 1, or whether the validity of the conduct
should be determined under the rule of reason. The eligibility and draft
rules of the professional sports leagues will be analyzed in this framework.
142. See note 137 supra.
143. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 64, at 169-70. Professor Sullivan states
that the following is the traditional rule of reason: "[W]here an arrangement does
not obviously stifle competition, but may adversely affect it, analysis of the ar-
rangement must be pursued to gauge its purpose and effect." Id. Thus, proof of
conduct that is not illegal per se does not carry a conclusive presumption of ille-
gality. Instead, that conduct may be justified as being reasonable, even though it
restrains trade, if it is in the public interest or if it, in fact, has no anticompetitive
purpose. Id. § 65, at 172-74.
Current application of the rule of reason entails four issues: identifying the
practice involved, determining the purpose of the restraints, identifying the likely
effects of the practice, and determining whether, on the whole, the restriction im-
posed substantially impeded competition. Id. § 68, at 187-88.
In National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978),
the society sought to defend its ban on competitive bidding by engineers under
rule of reason analysis by asserting that competition in the profession was not in
the public interest because it would force engineers to produce inferior work to
meet those bids. Id. at 687. Thus, the society argued that the restraint on com-
petition was reasonable because competition itself was unreasonable in this pro-
fession. The Court rejected this defense:
[T]he purpose of the [rule of reason] analysis is to form a judgment about
the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a
policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of
the members of an industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute,that policy decision has been made by the Congress.
Id. at 692 (emphasis added). Thus, modem rule of reason analysis looks only at
the impact the restraint has on competitive conditions, id. at 690, by comparing
the restraint's short-term anticompetitive effect with its long-term procompetitive
effect. If the net effect of the restraint promotes competition, the restraint is
reasonable.
Although a court will look only at the net economic effect of a restraint in rule
of reason analysis after Professional Engineers, that analysis is used more often
under Broadcast Muqic, Inc. v. -Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979) ["BMr']. In BMI, the Court held that restraints with which a court had not
had "considerable experience" should be analyzed under the rule of reason and
should not be held illegal per se, even if the restraint appears to fall in an illegal
per se category. Id. at 8-10.
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B. The Eligibility Rules
As discussed in Part II of this Comment,'44 the eligibililty rules im-
posed by the leagues prohibit certain athletes from playing for league
teams. Arguably, these rules restrain trade in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act because the effect of that prohibition is to lessen
competition: the number of athletes eligible to compete with entering and
present players for jobs is reduced. In antitrust terminology, this type of
arrangement is known as a "group boycott"' 45" because the teams in the
league, as a group, refuse to purchase the services of athletes who do not
meet the eligibility rules imposed by the league. A group boycott also is
sometimes called a "concerted refusal to deal"'' 46 because the team owners,
as a group, refuse to deal with ineligible athletes for their services. These
terms are not interchangeable, 47 however, because the tests used to deter-
mine if each type of conduct violates section 1 may differ.
Conduct characterized as a group boycott is illegal per se;' 48 proof that
the conduct occurred establishes, by itself, a violation of section 1. There is
confusion, however, over whether conduct characterized as a concerted
refusal to deal is to be analyzed under the per se rule or the rule of
reason.' 49 This confusion exists because the term "group boycott" is ap-
plied to several types of activity that arguably should be analyzed different-
ly. Thus, conduct that constitutes a group boycott must be distinguished
from that which only constitutes a concerted refusal to deal,' 0 and the
tests for a violation of section 1 that apply to each type of conduct must be
identified.
1. Group Boycotts versus Concerted Refusals to Deal
A group boycott is aimed at direct competitors of the group and is in-
itiated for an anticompetitive purpose; a concerted refusal to deal may be
144. See pp. 798-802"supra.
145. "A group boycott is group action to coerce third parties to conform to
the pattern of conduct desired by the group or to secure their [the third parties]
removal from competition." Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 244 F. Supp. 235,
238 (E.D. Pa. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 361 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1966). Thus,
the league coerces athletes into conforming to their eligibility requirements by
denying entry into the league until those requirements are met. Until eligible,
those athletes are barred from competing with athletes in the league for jobs.
146. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 83, at 229. See Arzee Supply Corp. v.
Rubberoid Co., 222 F. Supp. 237, 242 (D. Conn. 1963).
147. All group boycotts are not concerted refusals to deal; all concerted
refusals to deal are not in the illegal per se category of group boycotts. See L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 83, at 231-32. See also notes 151-55 and accompany-
ing text infra.
148. See cases cited note 141 supra.
149. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 83, at 229-30. See notes 156-85 and ac-
companying text infra.
150. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 83, at 229-30.
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aimed at competitors or noncompetitors and may be initiated for the pur-
pose of affecting competition or for a valid purpose unrelated to competi-
tion. 151
In a classic group boycott, the boycotting group seeks to cripple a com-
petitor.1 5 2 When a group of manufacturers agree not to buy from any sup-
plier who sells to certain other manufacturers, they are engaging in a
group boycott of the other manufacturers. 1 53 Included in this kind of
group boycott is a concerted refusal to deal: members of the boycotting
group refuse to deal with any supplier who deals with the target manufac-
turer. A group boycott can occur without a refusal to deal, however.
Manufacturers can induce the suppliers not to sell to another manufac-
turer by convincing them that the other manufacturer is a poor credit
risk.15 4 While the conspiring manufacturers do not refuse to deal with the
target, they cause a boycott of the isolated manufacturer.
In addition, refusals to deal and group boycotts can also be
distinguished by their purpose and effect. In both of the previous examples
involving group boycotts, the target of the conspiracy was a direct com-
petitor. Such tactics aimed at a direct competitor will always have some
anticompetitive effect. In contrast are situations when the targetof the
conduct is not a direct competitor. For example, a group of manufacturers
may be concerned about the unsavory tactics used by some retailers of
their produce. Fearing that this conduct will reflect badly on their indus-
try, they agree not to deal with any retailers who employ such tactics. 55
Their purpose dearly is not anticompetitive and their refusal to deal is not
an illegal group boycott. The manufacturers merely are using their power
to clean up the industry. These distinctions are important when conduct is
characterized to determine the test that should be applied to the conduct
under section 1 analysis.
2. Per Se Rule versus Rule of Reason
Beginning with the 1941 decision in Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC, 5 6 the United States Supreme Court continually has
151. See notes 152-55 and accompanying text infra.
152. See generally L. SULLIVANsuspr. note 34, § 83. Compare Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (classic group boycott
against direct competitor); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (same); McCann v. New York Stock Exch., 107 F.2d
908 (2d Cir. 1939) (same); AMA v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(same), affd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) with United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, 282
U.S. 44 (1930) (concerted refusal to deal with other levels); Paramount Famous
Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) (same); Cement Mfrs. Protective
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) (same).
153. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 83, at 230.
154. Id. at 230-31.
155. See generally id. at 231-32.
156. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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held, both implicitly and explicitly, that group boycotts are illegal per
se.'"7 In each case, the group boycott was directed at a direct competitor of
the defendants. Thus, when the target competes on the same level as the
boycotting group, the courts will find that the conduct constitutes a group
boycott and is illegal per se.
It is not clear, however, what test the Supreme Court wil apply to con-
duct where the target is not a direct competitor. In two cases decided in
1930. the Supreme Court examined boycott arrangements aimed at non-
competitors. In United Statesv. First National Pictures Inc., 158 film distrib-
utors agreed to use a standard form contract that required exhibitors to
provide security against default. They further agreed that they would not
deal with exhibitors who refused to do so. 5 9 Paramount Famous Lasky
Corp. v. United States'6" involved a similar agreement between film distri-
butors which required that exhibitors agree to arbitrate disputes with the
distributors.1 6' In neither case did the Court label the arrangements as
group boycotts or find that the conduct was illegal per se. The Court ap-
plied the rule of reason and found that the arrangements were anticompe-
titive and that they violated the Sherman Act. 62 These cases, however,
were decided before the Court fully articulated the per se doctrine and ap-
plied it to group boycotts.1 63 Thus, it is not certain that the cases would still
be analyzed under the rule of reason today.
Arguably, the per se approach applied to group boycotts should not
apply in these situations. Professor Lawrence Sullivan, author of the
leading treatise on antitrust law, 6 4 argues that arrangements which set
nonprice terms of trade with entities on another level of competition
should not be illegal per se because they are not as consistently adverse to
competition as group boycotts, which are aimed at direct competitors.
Under the rule of reason, he argues, arrangements against competitors on
other levels that obviously are anticompetitive, such as the ones found in
Lasky and First National Pictures, automatically will be found to violate
the Act, while arrangements that have some merit and may not be anti-
competitive can be scrutinized more closely.' 65
Professor Sullivan's approach was adopted by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd.,' 66 where the court analyzed under the rule
157. Id. at 466-68 (implied application of per se rule).
158. 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
159. Id. at 49-51.
160. 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
161. Id. at 37-38.
162. 282 U.S. at 54-55; 282 U.S. at 43-44.
163. See cases cited note 141 supra.
164. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34.
165. Id. § 90, at 256-57.
166. 416 F.2d 71(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
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of reason an agreement between two distillers to break away from the pre-
sent distributor and together offer their merchandise to a new distributor.
The court held that this was not a group boycott subject to the per se rule
because it was not designed to eliminate a competitor from the market by
cutting off its suppliers or customers.1 67 In a case more similar to the
league rules situation, Molinas v. National Basketball Association, 68 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that the NBA had not violated the Sherman Act by banning from league
play a player who admitted to gambling on league games. The conduct,
which was not aimed at a competitor of the league, was found to be
reasonable under the rule of reason. 69
The argument advanced by Professor Sullivan and supported by the
Seagram and Molinas decisions bolsters the argument that the eligibility
rules of the professional sports leagues are not aimed at direct competitors
of the leagues but at the ineligible athletes who do not compete with the
league. Thus, the eligibility rules arguably should be analyzed under the
rule of reason because they do not constitute a classic group boycott, which
is illegal per se.
The argument for rule of reason analysis under section I of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act did not succeed, however, in the one direct attack on
the eligibility rules of the professional sports leagues. Spencer Haywood
had been an All-American at the University of Detroit before joining the
Denver Rockets of the American Basketball Association, the rival league
of the NBA.1 70 In 1971, he attacked the NBA rule which required that a
player be out of high school for at least four years before he could enter the
league, contending that those rules constituted a group boycott that
violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' 71 In.Denver Rockets v.
All-Pro Management, Inc. 172 the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California allowed an injunction against enforcement of the
league's rule, which allowed Haywood to play for the Rockets, to stand.1
7 3
The court found that the rule constituted a classic group boycott 74 and,
thus, was illegal per se. 17 5
In Denver Rockets, the NBA argued that a narrow exception to appli-
cation of the per se rule to group boycotts should apply.17 6 The exception
167. 416 F.2d at 78-79.
168. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
169. Id. at 244-45.
170. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1052,
1060 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
171. Id. at 1060-61.
172. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
173. Id. at 1067.
174. Id. at 1061.
175. Id. at 1063-64.
176. Id. at 1064-66.
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the NBA claimed was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.177 The defendant-brokers in Silver
claimed it would be inappropriate to find that they violated the Sherman
Act because the boycott of Silver, another broker, was a self-enforcement
mechanism required by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.178 The
Supreme Court stated, "The fundamental issue confronting us is whether
the Securities Exchange Act has created a duty of Exchange self-regulation
so pervasive as to constitute an implied repealer of our antitrust laws,
thereby exempting the exchange from liability in this and similar cases. ,,'79
The Court examined the history and role of exchange self-regulation and
found that, in certain situations, the self-regulation requirement would
justify what otherwise might be a violation of the antitrust laws.' 80
To qualify for this exception to per se treatment, a defendant must
establish the following elements: a legislative mandate for self-regulation
"or otherwise," that the collective action is intended to accomplish an end
that is within the policy of self-regulation, and that the means used to
accomplish the self-regulation were not overbro ad.'"' If these requirements
are met, the conduct is analyzed under the rule of reason instead of being
illegal per se.' 8 2
In Denver Rockets, the court found that the NBA failed to establish
the requirements of the Silver exception from per se analysis because the
NBA eligibility rules were overbroad. 83 It is also improbable that the
other leagues could meet even the first requirement of the Silver excep-
tion. There is no legislative mandate for the eligibility rules. Thus, the
leagues would have to show that those rules were "otherwise" mandated.
The Silver Court extensively discussed the important public policies sup-
porting self-enforcement under the Securities Exchange Act. 84 There-
fore, courts are likely to require a strong public policy mandate to satisfy
the Silver Court's "or otherwise" language; it is unlikely that the leagues
can show such a mandate for their eligibility rules.
In summary, the eligibility rules would be illegal per se if those rules
constitute group boycotts, if courts follow Denver Rockets in applying the
per se rule to that conduct, and the leagues fail to meet the Silver exception
requirements. The rules may be analyzed under the rule of reason if the
conduct does not constitute a classic group boycott or other illegal per se
activity, if the courts adopt Professor Sullivan's argument, as supported by
177. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). See generally L. SULLIVAN, sujr a note 34, § 88.
178. 373 U.S. at 346-47.
179. Id. at 347.
180. Id. at 361.
181. Id. at 361-67. See 325 F. Supp. at 1064-65.
182. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 88, 247-48.
183. 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
184. 373 U.S. at 349-57.
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Seagram and Molinas,18 5 for analyzing the group boycott of non-
competitors under the rule of reason, or if the Silver exception is es-
tablished. The following section will analyze the league eligibility rules
under these alternative rules.
3. Application of Rules
Application of the per se test results in automatic violation of section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 186 If the eligibility rules are group boycotts,
they are illegal per se; the leagues can present no justifications in defense of
those rules. If the rule of reason is applied, however, the rules will be found
to violate section 1 only if they are undue restraints on competition.1 87
Thus, the leagues would have an opportunity to justify the eligibility rules
and show that the rules were reasonable.
First, the leagues could argue that the eligibility rules are justified
because they keep professional sports from interfering with the players'
education.188 This argument has merit with respect to the professional
baseball rule and the NBA rule because they are based primarily on the
player's departure from high school. Compulsory attendance re-
quirements evidence the strong state policy favoring high school educa-
tion. For example, Missouri generally requires that people attend school
until age sixteen.18 9 The NBA rules, however, require that the person
finish high school, at which time the student is usually eighteen years of
age. Thus, it could even be argued that the rule, as supported by this
justification, is overbroad. The same justification does not exist for the
NFL rules because the public policy in favor of attending college is not as
compelling. In fact, many people lack the intellectual or financial ability
to attend college. The NFL rule offers no exception for these people and
likely is overbroad for that reason, even if the justification were accepted.
In addition, the NFL does not require that a player actually graduate, just
that he wait for a certain period of time before becoming eligible. In
Denver Rockets,190 the court found that the education justification was
commendable but outweighed by the public policy supporting economic
competition. The court also said that if the balance should be shifted,
Congress should do so. 19
185. See notes 164-69 and accompanying text supra.
186. See note 137 supra.
187. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911) (§ I outlaws
any "contract or combination by which an undue restraint of interstate or foreign
commerce was brought about"). See note 143 supra. See generally L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 34, § 65, at 173.
188. 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
189. RSMo § 167.031 (1978). Exceptions are granted for mental or physical
incapacitation and legal employment between the ages of 14 and 16, if the
employment is found to be desirable. Id.
190. 325 F. Supp. at 1049.
191. Id. at 1066.
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A second possible justification, also raised in Denver Rockets, 192 is that
the eligibility rules were financially necessary to the league. The merits of
that claim can be examined by example. Shortly after the Denver Rockets
decision, the NBA adopted the "hardship rule," which allowed early entry
into the draft if special financial needs were shown. This later was amended
so that any player who was out of high school could choose to become eligi-
ble for the draft. 193 Essentially, the new rule permits anyone who so wishes
to be treated as college graduates were under the old rule. The teams are
not required to draft such a player or sign him if they do not wish. In
Denver Rockets, the court countered this argument by observing that the
Supreme Court had disavowed it with respect to group boycott cases in
Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores. 194
A more persuasive justification for the rules was suggested by counsel
for Haywood in the Denver Rockets case. As the NBA rule existed then and
the NFL rule exists today, colleges serve as farm systems for the profes-
sional franchises. Professional baseball incurs the expense of developing
their players prior to competition on the major league level; 19 the NFL
and the NBA do not. Haywood suggested that by prohibiting teams from
raiding the college teams for their top talent, the rules keep college athletic
programs healthy so they will continue to serve as an ideal training ground
for future professional athletes. 196 As seen from the NBA rule change,
however, players out of high school may be given the freedom to choose to
become eligible for the draft instead of playing college basketball without
causing college athletic programs to disintegrate.
For these reasons, it appears that the NFL eligibility rules, which
generally require an athlete to have attended college for four years, cannot
be justified as being reasonable. Their unreasonableness becomes ap-
parent when their effect is compared with the effect of the professional
baseball and NBA eligibility rules, which generally allow athletes to play
in the league after high school. Practically, the baseball and NBA eligibil-
ity rules have little effect on athletes because it is rare that a high school
athlete has the ability and maturity to compete professionally in those
sports. On the other hand, the NFL rules stand as a roadblock between
outstanding college athletes 97 and the money they could make in profes-
192. Id.
193. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
194. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
195. In professional baseball, each major league team sponsors a series of
minor league teams that develop and train athletes for major league play. Unlike
football and basketball, in which signed athletes play for the major league team
from the beginning, most professional baseball players start their careers playing
for a minor league team sponsored by the major league team with which they
signed. See generally Shapiro, Monopsony Means Never Having to Say You're
Sorry-A Look at Baseball's Minor Leagues, 4J. CONTEMP. L. 191 (1978).
196. 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
197. See note 16 supra.
822 [Vol. 46
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [1981], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/3
ANTITRUST AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
sional football. The professional baseball and NBA rules illustrate that, at
a minimum, the NFL eligibility rules are overbroad because they provide
no exception for the talented college players who might prefer professional
football to a college education. For these reasons, the NFL eligibility rules
probably would be held to violate the antitrust laws, even under the rule of
reason. The professional baseball and NBA eligibility rules are legally
suspect, but in fact only minimally restrain entry. The NFL eligibility
rules, however, work a significant hardship on many players. The NFL
rules cannot be justified as being reasonable and probably would befound
to violate section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act under either per se or rule
of reason analysis.
C. The Draft Procedures
The framework used to analyze the eligibility rules must also be used to
analyze the league rules on draft procedures: does the conduct restrain
trade, and if so, does the per se rule or rule of reason apply?198 As discussed
in Part II of this Comment,1 99 the procedures for conducting the league
drafts restrain prospective players in two ways. They limit the player's
ability to select the team for which he will play, and they reduce his
bargaining power by allowing him to negotiate with only one team.20 0
Arguably, therefore, the conduct restrains trade. The character of the
conduct determines which rule will be used to analyze the conduct under
section 1.
Application of the per se rule to the draft rules can be argued on three
grounds. First, the draft rules arguably constitute group boycotts because
the nondrafting teams refuse to bargain with the player, and the drafting
team will deal with the player only in accordance with the league rules.
This argument was adopted in Smith v. Pro-Football2°0 and Robertson v.
National Basketball Association,20 2 where United States district courts
held that the NFL and the NBA draft procedures, respectively, con-
stituted group boycotts203 and were illegal per se under section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.20 4 This analysis is questionable for the same
198. See notes 135-43 and accompanying text supra.
199. See pp. 798-802 supra.
200. See notes 18-32 and accompanying text supra.
201. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
202. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
203. 420 F. Supp. at 744-45; 389 F. Supp. at 893. The Smith court based its
finding that the NFL draft constituted a group boycott on the following analysis:
The essence of the draft is straightforward: the owners of the teams have
agreed among themselves that the right to negotiate with top quality
graduating college athletes will be allocated to one team, and that no
other team will deal with that person. This outright, undisguised refusal
to deal constitutes a group boycott in its classic and most pernicious
form.
420 F. Supp. at 744-45.
204. 420 F. Supp. at 744; 389 F. Supp. at 891-93.
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reasons that make analysis of the eligibility rules under the per se rule ques-
tionable: the target of the boycott is on a different level of competition
than the league teams. 20 5 Nevertheless, the professional sports cases indi-
cate that if the per se rule is to be applied at all, it will be because the draft
procedure rules constitute a group boycott under this argument. 20 6 Se-
cond, the court in Robertson also noted that the draft procedure rules
could be considered to be price fixing20 because the price of a player's ser-
vices is driven down when the number of teams bidding for those services is
limited. Such tampering with the price mechanism of a product places the
conduct in a category that is illegal per se. 20 8
The third argument for analyzing the draft procedures under the per
se rule is that the procedures are horizontal market divisions2 0 9 because
they divide the player market and eliminate competition between the
teams for the players who are allocated by the draft.210 This argument for
per se analysis is the most compelling. The draft procedures are analogous
to customer, product, and territorial allocations, which have been con-
demned under the per se rule. 21 1 The restraints on competition for players'
services are pernicious in the same way and for the same reasons that caused
horizontal market divisions to be classified as illegal per se. That is, they
eliminate competition for the players between entities that would other-
wise compete for the individual players. Although this was mentioned as a
basis for per se treatment in Robertson,21 2 it was not relied on by the court.
Notwithstanding the arguments in favor of per se analysis, there is
authority and justification for using the rule of reason. When confronted
with a unique or novel business arrangement, the Supreme Court has
warned against hasty application of the per se rule. In White Motor Co. v.
United States,215 the Court analyzed customer and territorial restrictions
between a manufacturer and its distributors. In rejecting the per se ap-
proach, the Court distinguished the arrangement from the market divi-
sions the courts usually encounter. 214 Therefore, the per se approach
205. See notes 156-70 and accompanying text supra.
206. See, e.g., 420 F. Supp. at 744; 389 F. Supp. at 891-93; 325 F. Supp. at
1056.
207. 389 F. Supp. at 893. Price fixing is defined as any arrangement, the pur-
pose or effect of which is to raise, depress, fix, peg, or stabilize prices and is illegal
per se. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
208. See notes 135-42 and accompanying text supra.
209. See note 139 and accompanying text supra.
210. See 389 F. Supp. at 893.
211. See Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321-22 (1967); United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352-55 (1967).
212. 389 F. Supp. at 893.
213. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1979); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
214. 372 U.S. at 263.
[Vol. 46824
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [1981], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/3
1981] ANTITRUST AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
should not be applied mechanically when the courts consider arrange-
ments with which they are not familiar.
The leagues can argue that the courts are not familiar with the unique
structure of the draft procedures and the relationship between league
teams, so that per se analysis of the draft procedure rules is precluded by
White Motor. First, the teams in the leagues are not competitors in the
traditional business sense of the word. They share their television revenue
and jointly conduct the business of offering sports entertainment. 2 5 Addi-
tionally, the strength of any one team depends on the strength of the
league itself. No team will benefit from the demise of a competing team
because the product offered to the public is the competition of the teams
with each other. 216 If courts apply White and analyze the draft procedure
rules under the rule of reason, the leagues must justify those rules as being
reasonable. 217
In Kapp v. National Football League,218 the entire reserve system of
the NFL was challenged. The United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California acknowledged the unique nature of professional
sports and, thus, applied the rule of reason. 21 9 The same approach was
taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Mackey v. National Football League.220 It faced a similar question involv-
ing the NFL reserve system.
In the rule of reason analysis, only one major justification is presented
to show that the draft procedure rules are reasonable. The leagues argue
that the viability of professional sports depends on offering the public com-
petition between evenly matched teams. Without the draft, they argue,
quality players would flock to the teams in the glamour cities of New York,
Los Angeles, and Chicago, and to the teams with wealthy owners. Thus, a
few very powerful teams would dominate league play, undermining com-
petition and spectator interest, and the business of professional sports
would be destroyed. 221
215. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620-21 (8th Cir.
1976); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 79-80 (N.D. Cal.
1974); United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323-25 (E.D.
Pa. 1953).
216. See cases cited note 215 supra.
217. See note 143 supra.
218. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
219. Id. at 81-82.
220. 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976).
221. Id. at 621; 390 F. Supp. at 81. The leagues could argue, therefore, that
the net competitive effect of the draftprocedure rules is procompetitive. Thus,
the restraints imposed by those rules would be reasonable under the rule of reason
analysis of National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978). See note 143 supra. It is doubtful, however, that the leagues could suc-
cessfully argue that the net competitive effect of the draft procedure rules is pro-
competitive. See notes 222-34 and accompanying text infra.
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Even if the maintenance of spectator interest through competitive
balance is a legitimate justification for the draft procedure rules,2 22 the
leagues must show that the draft procedure actually promotes competitive
balance and that less restrictive means are not available. In Smith v. Pro-
Football,223 the court found a very low correlation between the player draft
and the level of competition in the NFL. 224 Noting that nine of the NFL's
26 teams had dominated the league standings over the last three years, the
court concluded that the draft did not effectively promote competitive
balance. 225 Since the draft provides the less competitive teams with the
earlier selections in the draft, however, it is logical that it would benefit
competitive balance more than a perfectly equal distribution of incoming
talent.226 Conversely, a system that allows the players total freedom to
select for whom they play arguably would provide better competitive
balance because players would be attracted to the less competitive teams
where their chances of making the team and playing earlier in their careers
were greater. Because the abilities of the teams in recognizing talent are
uncertain, this argument should be considered.
ifthe league's justification for the draft procedures is accepted,
however, it must be determined if a less restrictive means of achieving the
same goal exists. If the procedures are more restrictive than necessary to
achieve competitive balance, they are unreasonable and thus violate sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 227 This is where the draft procedure
face their most formidable challenge. In Smith, the evidence indicated
that the scouts of professional football teams can identify five to ten top-
flight prospects per year and thirty to fifty other players certain to make
the teams that draft them. 228 Since the ability of the draft to distribute
talent is only as good as the ability of the scouting process to identify that
talent, 229 the court concluded that a draft that distributes more than the
fifty-five to seventy players that the scouts can identify as certain to make
the team drafting them is not justified. 230 Under this logic, according to
the court, an NFL draft of more than two rounds, with each team receiv-
ing one selection per round, is not justified. The NFL draft then consisted
of seventeen rounds, and for that reason, the Smith court found it unduly
222. This justification was accepted in theory in both Mackey and Kapp. The
court in Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 745-46 (D.D.C. 1976),
modified, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978), while applying the per se rule, discuss-
ed the justification in dictum.
223. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
-224. Id. at 746.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 746-47.
227. See note 143 supra.
228. 420 F. Supp. at 746.
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restrictive. 231 The Smith court suggested two revisions besides shortening
the draft that would help ease the restrictions. The court suggested that a
player could be drafted by more than one team and then the number of
players one team could sign could be limited.232 This would give the player
some choice of where to play and increase his bargaining power.
The draft procedures also could be improved if a time period was set
after which an unsigned player could negotiate with any team. This was
suggested by the court in Kapp, which stated, "[T]he draft rule... is also
patently unreasonable insofar as it permits [a] virtually perpetual boycott
of a draft prospect even when the drafting club refuses or fails within a
reasonable time to reach a contract with the player. '233 The court in
Mackey also found that the NFL draft procedure was more restrictive than
needed to achieve competitive balance. 234 This was because the draft in-
volved more players than possibly could affect competitive balance.
The draft procedure used by the NBA is less restrictive than the one
used by the NFL because it permits an unsigned player to be drafted by
another team in a later draft. It too, however, could be characterized as
overbroad because more players are drafted than the scouting systems can
evaluate. To the extent that players of uncertain talent and talent that only
marginally would affect competitive balance are drafted, the NBA rules
exceed the justification offered by the league.
In conclusion, even if maintenance of competitive balance is a
reasonable justification for the draft procedures, the procedures profes-
sional sports leagues employ are more restrictive than necessary. If
challenged, they could not be justified under the rule of reason because
they are overbroad, and therefore would be found to violate section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. For this reason, they should be modified great-
ly, if not abolished altogether. Prospective players should have the same
leeway to determine who to work for that most workers enjoy. Not only
would this more closely conform to the usual expectations in the economic
system, it is mandated by the Sherman Act.
V. CONCLUSION
Those who control professional sports have always conducted their
player personnel policies with an air of impunity, treating players as chat-
tels to be drafted, traded, and sold at will. Admittedly, some players now
can gain their freedom through free agent procedures in all three sports,
which allow teams to bid competitively for the services of veteran players
and allow the players to choose for which team they will play. This has
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. 390 F. Supp. at 82.
234. 543 F.2d at 622.
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altered the salary structure of the sports completely, yet competitive
balance and spectator interest have not been damaged. It is time that the
free market concepts, evidenced by these free agent procedures, be ex-
tended to the incoming players. It is apparent now that the catastrophe
that owners in all three sports predicted would result from competitive
bargaining in the free agent process will not occur, and that these fears
should no longer preclude all players from benefitting from the open com-
petition mandated by the policies underlying the Sherman Antitrust Act.
It may be easier to appreciate the nature of these restraints by con-
sidering the reaction if the largest corporations in the country conducted a
draft of the top Master in Business Administration graduates. If such a
graduate had but one employer to negotiate with and no choice of where
he would live and work, the sense of outrage would be clear. Why should
one react differently to the plight of professional athletes? The league
restrictions were characterized vividly by Judge Frank of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit who, in discussing the professional
baseball rules in 1949, said:
As one court, perhaps a bit exaggeratedly, has put it, "While the
services of these baseball players are ostensibly secured by volun-
tary contracts a study of the system as... practiced under the plan
of the National Agreement, reveals the involuntary character of
the servitude which is imposed upon players by the strength of the
combination controlling the labor of practically all of the players
in the country.. . ." [I]f the players be regarded as quasi-peons, it
is of no moment that they are well paid; only the totalitarian-
minded will believe that high pay excuses virtual slavery. 25
ROBERT B. TERRY
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